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As elections are the essential mechanism through which ordinary 
citizens play their roles in choosing the right representatives, whether 
regular elections could motivate politicians to represent voters’ 
preferences has been studied in research on models of “electoral 
accountability” (Ashworth 2005, Austen-Smith and Banks 1989, Duggan 
2000, Banks and Sundaram 1993, 1998, Fearon 1999, Ferejohn 1986, 
Reed 1994). Departing from Downs’ electoral competition, these 
studies drop the commitment assumption and develop dynamic models 
in which politicians can choose a policy freely after being elected. 
Especially, Duggan (2000) constructs an infinitely repeated election 
model with one-dimensional policies and heterogenous voters, and 
proves the existence of equilibria where the median voter is decisive 
in every election and the policy outcome eventually lies in an 
interval around the median ideal policy.1)
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However, one drawback of the existing models of accountability is 
that they ignore the role of electoral campaigns. In those models, 
voters formulate expectations about future policy choices by an 
incumbent based on her past policy choice. By contrast, a challenger 
is randomly selected and voters know nothing but the distribution 
from which the challenger is drawn. The assumption about 
incumbents may be theoretically sound because the past records of 
incumbents are crucial to voters’ judgments about them. The 
assumption about challengers, however, can be justified only when 
electoral campaigns are completely uninformative, so that voters 
cannot differentiate characteristics of challengers. However, not all 
types of campaign activities can be regarded as a mere cheap talk. 
Some efforts during electoral campaigns are costly and hence may 
provide useful information about challengers. For instance, the fact 
that a challenger builds a large amount of campaign money could be 
an indicator of her competence. If so, challengers may try to raise 
money in order to send a signal to voters that they are competent. 
This strategic interaction between a challenger and voters is an 
important component of electoral processes, and thus it must be taken 
1) There are a couple of extensions of the repeated election model with diff
erent contributions (Banks and Duggan 2002, Bernhardt, Dubey, and 
Hughson 2004, Bernhardt, Campuzano, Squintani, and Cˆamara 2009). Banks 
and Duggan consider a repeated election model with a general finite 
dimensional Euclidean space and show that Duggan’s (2000) result is 
extended to a multidimensional policy space. Bernhardt, Dubey, and 
Hughson model repeated elections with term limits and show that the 
presence of term limits reduces the set of incumbents’ policy choices that 
guarantee their reelection. By introducing political parties into Duggan’s 
model, Bernhardt, et al. (2009) show that competition between two 
polarizing parties may result in more centralized policy outcomes.
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into account. 
We develop a game-theoretic model of infinitely repeated elections 
in which strategic challengers are present. The specific features of the 
model are as follows. There is a continuum of voters who have 
single-peaked preferences over one-dimensional policies. Politicians’ 
characteristics are of two dimensions, policy preference and quality, 
which are private information. While voters have heterogenous 
preferences over policies, they unanimously agree that high quality is 
better than low quality. In each period, a challenger is randomly 
selected from the pool of citizens and strategically decides the level 
of a costly signal that she will send to voters. An election between 
the challenger and the incumbent (the winner in the previous period 
election) is held, and the election outcome is determined by majority 
rule. In order to compare the challenger and the incumbent, voters 
use information from the challenger’s signaling strategy as well as 
from the incumbent’s past policy choice. The winner of the election 
becomes the incumbent and decides the policy outcome in the current 
period. This process is repeated infinitely. The model is dynamic, and 
therefore our analysis makes predictions about policy choices and 
electoral outcomes over time. 
By a signal, in this paper, we mean any activity on the candidates’ 
part satisfying two properties. First, a higher level of activity should 
cost more. Second, the cost for sending any given signal is at least 
as cheap for the higher quality candidate as for the lower quality 
candidate. As mentioned above, for example, the amount of campaign 
money could work as one of the most effective signals. Obviously 
raising more money should be more difficult for each candidate. 
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However, since campaign donors consider the quality of the 
candidate, it should not be harder for high quality candidates to 
collect the same amount of money than for low quality candidates. 
Also, previous office-holding experience can be another example of a 
costly signal. Empirically, previous office-holding experience works as 
the best for gauging challengers’ quality, as much research on U.S. 
electoral competition demonstrates. 
We prove that, under certain conditions, there exists an equilibrium 
with the following characteristics. First, we observe a positive signal 
from challengers only when the performance of incumbents is neither 
“too good” nor “too bad” with respect to the median voter’s utility. 
When there is a positive signal in equilibrium, the challenger is 
elected. When the performance of an incumbent is too good (a 
centrist policy choice from a “high quality” incumbent), the 
incumbent is elected without being contested by a costly campaign 
from a challenger. When the performance is too bad (either an 
extreme policy choice from a high quality incumbent, or any choice 
from a low quality incumbent), a challenger can defeat the incumbent 
even without engaging in a costly campaign. Second, the signals 
from challengers convey information about their quality but no 
information about their policy preferences. Thus, in equilibrium, a 
positive signal is sent only by high quality challengers and by all 
types of high quality challengers.
Our findings contribute to the formal literature of electoral 
competition but also to our understanding of one of the most 
well-known topics in the American politics literature, the incumbency 
advantage. As a general rule in U.S. elections at both the national 
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and local levels, more incumbents secure their seats than lose them, 
and they have better chance of being reelected today than they had 
in the past (Mayhew 1974, Jewell and Breaux 1988, Cox and 
Morgenstern 1993, 1995, Cox and Katz 1996, Ansolabehere and 
Snyder 2004, Carson, Sievert, and Williamson 2015). In the 1960s 
and 1970s, only about 6-7 percent of incumbent members of 
Congress who had sought reelection were defeated. In 2002 a record 
99 percent of incumbents who had pursued reelections won their 
elections. Also, in state legislative elections, on average, over 97 
percent of incumbent legislators won their reelections in recent years, 
while they had more than a 6 percent defeat rate when they sought 
reelection in the 1970s.2)
For the sources of incumbency advantage and the causes of its 
growth, it is generally believed that there are other factors than the 
policy issue which voters consider when they decide whom to vote 
for in elections. First, incumbent legislators have good resources they 
can use for constituency services. By using franking privileges, staff 
support, and their operating budgets, legislators can provide many 
services to their constituents and this gives them a big electoral 
advantage against their opponents (King 1991, Cox and Morgenstern 
1993, 1995, Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). Second, generally 
incumbents collect more campaign money and run better campaigns 
than their challengers (Abramowitz 1991, Jacobson 1997, ch.3). Third, 
most of incumbents enjoy name recognition challengers do not benefit 
2) Carson, Sievert, and Williamson (2015) show that incumbents have been 
advantaged even when they extended the investigation back to the 
antebellum era.
138   Insun Kang
from (Jacobson 1981, Campbell 1983, Serra and Cover 1992). Since 
incumbents perform constituency services, manage better campaigns, 
and have more media coverage, they become familiar to voters and 
generally get good evaluations. Lastly, most incumbents can deter 
strong challengers from entering the elections (Krasno and Green 
1988, Squire 1991, Cox and Morgenstern 1993, Cox and Katz 1996, 
Levitt and Wolfram 1997, Ban, Llaudet, and Snyder 2014). When 
incumbents are running for reelection, most of the time the strongest 
challengers give up running against them, afraid of being defeated. 
Moreover, by raising large sums of early money, incumbents scare 
strong potential opponents off, which allows them to go uncontested 
(Squire 1991). Banks and Kiewiet (1989) theoretically show that 
weak challengers are more likely to run against incumbents than 
strong challengers by developing a model incorporating a primary 
election.
In contrast to the previous studies, this paper provides an 
explanation of the incumbency advantage without assuming any ex 
ante asymmetry between an incumbent and a challenger. In 
equilibrium in our model, the probability that an incumbent is 
reelected increases over time and finally converges to one. Since we 
do not assume any resource disparity between incumbents and 
challengers, and since we do not assume increasing competence from 
political experience, our result can be thought of as an endogenous 
emergence of the incumbency advantage. The main reason is as 
follows. Since voters can oust bad incumbents from office, as 
competitive elections are repeated, the incumbents who have survived 
are the good ones. Thus, the probability of incumbents’ being 
Strategic Challengers and the Incumbency Advantage   139
reelected increases over time. Similar arguments are made in different 
repeated election models (Banks and Duggan 2002, Duggan 2000). 
However, in those models, challengers are not strategic, so the result 
is somewhat transparent because the value of challengers is fixed at 
its expectation. By contrast, our result shows the emergence of the 
incumbency allowing for strategic campaigns of challengers.
Our findings show that asymmetry of information about candidates 
may be an important source of the incumbency advantage. In 
equilibrium, while a centrist incumbent can convince voters that she 
is moderate by implementing a centrist policy, a centrist challenger 
cannot credibly distinguish herself from a extremist challenger. 
However, in equilibrium, a high quality challenger can distinguish 
herself from low quality challengers by sending a costly signal. Thus, 
our theory of the incumbency advantage is distinct from models that 
incorporate the valence issue in the Downsian model (Bernhardt and 
Ingberman 1985, Gloseclose 2001, 2007, Berger, Munger, and Pottho
ff 2000, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000, Aragones and Palfrey 2002). 
Most of those models assume that voters award a valence advantage 
to one of the candidates exogenously and implicitly assume that the 
advantaged candidate is the incumbent. By contrast, our explanation 
does not rely on the exogenous quality difference between 
candidates.
Most of all, our results predict a non-monotonic relationship 
between the performance of an incumbent and the strength of the 
campaigns from strategic challengers. High quality challengers engage 
in a strong campaign activity only when the performance of an 
incumbent is at a medium level, that is, only when they can win the 
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election by active campaigning. This result is consistent with findings 
of empirical studies on U.S. elections. When incumbents are not 
strongly favored by voters, they are more likely to face strong 
challengers and lose their seats (Campbell 1983, Jacobson 1989, 
Squire 1989, Lublin 1994). Also, our finding is consistent with the 
“deterrence” explanation of the incumbency advantage. As mentioned, 
most of the incumbents can deter strong challengers from entering 
elections, and therefore, the strongest challengers confront incumbents 
only when there is a good chance of victory.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we 
describe the model. Section 3 presents the formal results of the 
model and Section 4 provides observational implications of our 
equilibrium analysis. Finally in section 5 we conclude. We leave all 
the formal proofs of results in the Appendix.
2. The Model
Let X = [−1, 1] be a set of policies and let N denote a continuum 
of citizens with its size being a unit mass. Each citizen is 
characterized by her ideal policy in X, say z. We assume z is 
distributed by a probability density function f on X. It is assumed that 
f is continuous, positive, i.e., f (z) > 0 for all z ∈ X, and symmetric, 
i.e., f (z) = f (−z) for all z ∈ X. There are two politicians, an 
incumbent and a challenger who are selected from citizens. When a 
citizen is selected as a politician, she is assigned a level of political 
competence (quality) q ∈ Q = {qH, qL} (qH > qL). For simplicity, we 
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normalize qL to 0. Then, the value of qH can be interpreted as the 
quality difference between a high quality and a low quality candidate. 
The probability that a politician is endowed with a “high” quality (qH) 
is  ∈ (0, 1) and the probability that she is endowed with a “low” 
quality (qL) is 1 − . We assume quality and ideal points are 
distributed independently. To define payoffs later, we need to define 
(stage) utility functions for citizens. For every ideal point z ∈ X and 
for every (x, q) ∈ X × Q, let denote the utility that a citizen with 
ideal point z receives when a policy x is implemented by a politician 
with quality q. That is, every citizen wants to minimize the distance 
between an implemented policy and her ideal point and prefers a 
high quality politician to a low quality one.3)
The game proceeds as follows. In period 0, an individual is 
randomly chosen as an incumbent and selects a policy x0 ∈ X. 
Then in each period t = 1, 2, ..., (1) a challenger who runs against 
the incumbent of time t − 1 is randomly drawn from N and is 
assigned quality q; (2) after observing the incumbent’s policy choice 
and quality level, the challenger decides the level of a costly signal 
st ∈ +. Citizens observe the signal by the challenger, but not her 
type; (3) an election is held, in which all citizens simultaneously cast 
their ballots between the incumbent from t − 1 and the challenger; if 
the proportion of citizens voting for the incumbent is at least one half, 
3) In the terminology of Groseclose (2007), voters have an one and half 
dimensional preference.
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the incumbent is reelected and becomes the incumbent in t. 
Otherwise, the challenger wins and becomes the incumbent in period 
t; (4) the incumbent at t implements a policy xt ∈ X. This chosen 
policy and her quality qt are observed by all citizens, and the game 
moves to t + 1. The payoff for a voter i with an ideal point z is
and the payoff for a politician i with z in this game is
where I(t) is the indicator function taking a value one if i is the 
office holder at t and zero otherwise, and J(t) is also the indicator 
function taking a value one if i is selected as a challenger at t and 
zero otherwise. The parameter ρ  0 is a nonnegative benefit for 
holding an office, δ ∈ [0, 1) is a common discount factor, and 
c(st|q) is the cost for sending a signal st. For every q ∈ Q, c(⋅|q) 
is continuous and strictly convex. Also, c(⋅|q) is strictly increasing, 
and for every s ∈ +, c(s|qL) ≥ c(s|qH ). Thus, for a given quality 
level, a higher signal is more costly than a lower one and for a 
given signal level, a challenger with low quality pays at least as a 
high cost as one with high quality does. We also normalize c(0|qL) = 
c(0|qH) = 0.
Our solution concept is simple equilibrium. A simple equilibrium is 
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a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in simple strategies. A profile of 
simple strategies satisfies the following. First, a challenger’s signaling 
depends only on the incumbent’s policy choice and quality level in 
the previous period. Second, when voting at period t, voters only 
consider the policy choice and quality level of the incumbent at t − 
1 and a challenger’s level of signal at t. Third, each politician’s 
policy choice is stationary in that whenever she is elected as an o
fficeholder, she chooses the same policy determined by her type. 
Lastly, we consider only symmetric equilibria where individuals of 
the same type adopt the same strategies. If two citizens share the 
same policy preference, their voting strategies are the same and if 
two politicians have the same type (both policy preferences and 
quality level), their strategies for policy choice and signaling rule are 
the same.
From the last type-symmetry condition, we can express a simple 
strategy as only depending on individual types. Then, a voting rule is 
a function
where 0 means voting for a challenger and 1 means voting for an 
incumbent. That is, v(x, q, s|z) is the ballot a voter with ideal point 
z casts after observing an incumbent’s policy choice x and quality 
level q, and a challenger’s signal s. A signaling strategy is a function
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when, l(x, q|z, qC) is a level of a signal a challenger with an ideal 
policy position z and quality qC sends when observing incumbent’s x 
and q. Lastly, policy choice strategy is a function
where p(z, q) ∈ X is the policy a politician with type (z, q) 
would choose whenever she holds the office.
Voters have beliefs on candidates’ types after they observe the 
incumbent’s policy choice and quality level, (x, q), and a challenger’s 
signal s. Let (⋅|x, q) be the voters’ belief about the incumbent’s 
type conditional on observing policy choice x by an incumbent with 
quality q. Let (⋅|x, q, s) be the voters’ belief about a challenger’s 
policy preference after observing an incumbent with policy choice x 
and quality q and a challenger’s signal s.4) Let (x, q, s) be the 
voters’ beliefs of the probability that the challenger’s quality is high 
after observing the same event. As is standard, all beliefs are updated 
using the Bayes rule whenever possible. Let σ = (v, l, p, , , ) 
denote a profile of simple strategies (and beliefs) of this game.
We now discuss the optimality conditions for each part of an 
equilibrium strategy profile. We first consider voting strategies. Since 
there is a continuum of voters, no one would be pivotal, which 
makes every voting behavior a trivial best response. Therefore, we 
revise our optimality condition in a standard way by assuming that 
citizens decide whom to vote for based on which candidate gives 
4) Technically ηI (⋅|x, q) and ηC (⋅|x, q, s) are probability measures on X.
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them the higher expected payoff. In other words, each voter behaves 
as if she was pivotal, i.e., she votes for a challenger if the expected 
payoff from electing a challenger is higher than the expected payoff 
from reelecting an incumbent. The expected payoffs are computed 
precisely in the appendix. For a given strategy profile σ = (v, l, p, 
, , ), for b ∈ {0, 1}, we denote the expected payoff for a 
voter with ideal point z from outcome b when she observes the 
incumbent’s policy choice x and quality q and a signal s by Uz(b|x, 
q, s; σ), where b = 0 denotes a win for the challenger while 1 a 
win for the incumbent. If σ is an equilibrium, then, it must satisfy 
the following condition: for all x, q, s, and z,
Note that this condition implies that when a voter is indifferent 
between the incumbent and a challenger, she votes for the incumbent.
Next we consider signaling choices of challengers. Given a strategy 
profile σ, for any s ∈ + and any (t, qC) ∈ X × Q, let V(t,qC)(s|x, 
q; σ) denote the expected payoff for a challenger of type (t, qC) 
from sending a signal s when observing an incumbent with (x, q). In 
equilibrium,
In equilibrium, for each given (x, q), there exists cutpoint level of 
a signal s(x, q) ∈ + such that every challenger, after observing an 
incumbent with policy choice x and quality q, chooses a level of 
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signal either s(x, q) or 0. To see this, suppose s(x, q) is the 
minimum signal level that induces a challenger’s election given 
voters’ strategies after observing (x, q). If a challenger sends a signal 
s with 0 < s < s(x, q), she still loses the election and pays a 
positive cost for signaling. The similar logic applies to the case 
where challenger sends a signal s > s(x, q) because in this case she 
is elected against incumbent but she pays more than it is needed. If 
there is no minimum level of signal, we can set s(x, q) = 0. 
Therefore, when sending a signal, a challenger only considers either 
sending s(x, q) or sending no signal. Then, we can simplify the 
optimality condition of challenger’s signaling strategy such that in 
equilibrium,
Finally, we discuss policy choices for incumbents. Given a strategy 
profile σ, let W(z,q)(x; σ) be the expected payoff an incumbent with 
ideal point z and quality q receives when she implements a policy x. 
In equilibrium every policy choice must be optimal, that is,
3. Formal Results
We now give the technical results of our election game. We begin 
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with a helpful lemma on median decisiveness and then present our 
existence theorem. The implication of our results will be discussed in 
the next section.
In the following Lemma, we identify an important necessary 
condition for a strategy profile to be a simple equilibrium. Note that 
the assumption that the distribution of citizen ideal points, f, is 
symmetric implies that zero is the unique median ideal point. Our 
first result establishes decisiveness of the median voter in elections.
Lemma 1 For every equilibrium σ and every (x, q, s) ∈ X × 
Q× +, an incumbent is elected if and only if  v(x, q, s|0) = 1.
In words, Lemma 1 states that, in every equilibrium and in every 
election, the winner is determined by the median voter’s voting 
decision. That is, if the median voter votes for an incumbent, then 
the incumbent is reelected; otherwise, a challenger is elected. Thus, if 
the policy is one-dimensional and voters unanimously agree that what 
is a good quality of office holders, those who pursue to be elected 
must appeal to the voter who takes the median position with respect 
to the policy dimension.
The lemma establishes the robustness of Black’s (1958) median 
voter theorem to dynamic interactions and ‘one and half’ dimension 
of policy spaces. Duggan (2000) proves that electoral outcomes are 
determined by the median voter’s vote in his one-dimensional model 
of repeated election, so first shows that the well-known median voter 
theorem is extended to a dynamic electoral competition. Grosclose 
(2007) proves that, in a static social choice problem where voters’ 
utilities are determined by the one-dimensional policy and the office- 
holder’s quality, the majority preference is transitive and coincide 
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with the median voter’s preference. Our lemma extends Duggan’s 
result to the ‘one and half’ dimensional policy spaces and 
Grosclose’s result to a dynamic non-cooperative setting, and thus 
shows a stronger robustness of the median voter theorem.
Lemma 1 is a consequence of Lemma 2.1 of Banks and Duggan 
(2006a). In it, they prove that if voters’ preferences over alternatives 
are quadratic, then the majority preference over lotteries on the 
alternative space is identical to the ‘core’ voter’s preference over 
them. In the model of this paper, the expected payoff from every 
strategy profile at every history can be thought of as the expected 
utility from a ‘continuation lottery,’ which is a lottery on the space 
X × Q.5) Although voters do not have quadratic preferences on X × 
Q in our model, they have quadratic preferences on the policy space 
X. Moreover, since their preferences over Q is separately additive and 
unanimous, the result of Banks and Duggan is transparently extended 
to the median decisiveness of our model. For this reason, we do not 
provide a separate proof of Lemma 1.
We now state the main result of this study. Let ν denote the 
variance of the distribution . Recall that qH 
denotes the quality level of a high quality type politician and  
denotes the probability that a randomly selected politician is endowed 
with high quality. Our main result shows that, under a certain 
condition, there is a simple equilibrium with some interesting 
characteristics. In the following, we first formally state the main 
theorem of the paper, and then we discuss the intuition of it.
5) To see how to specify such a continuation lottery, see Banks and Duggan 
(2006a).
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Theorem 1 Let qH  ν and δ  . Then there 
exists a simple equilibrium σsuch that σ satisfies the following for 
some w1, w2, c1, c2 ∈ (0, 1] (w1 < w2, w1  c1, w2  c2) and s > 0.
1. Low quality incumbents’ policy choices
  • For all z ∈ X, p(z, qL) = z.
2. High quality incumbents’ policy choices
  • p(z, qH) = z if z ∈ [−w1, w1]∪[−w2, −c1)∪(c1, w2]∪[−1, 
− max{c1, c2})∪(max{c1, c2}, 1].
  • p(z, qH) = w1 if z ∈ (w1, c1].
  • p(z, qH) = −w1 if z ∈ [−c1, −w1).
  • p(z, qH) = w2 if z ∈ (max{c1, w2}, c2].
  • p(z, qH) = −w2 if z ∈ [−c2, − max{c1, w2}).
3. Challengers’ signaling strategies
  • For all (x, q, z) ∈ X × Q × X, l(x, q|z, qL) = 0.
  • For all (x, q, z) ∈ X × Q× X, l(x, q|z, qH) = s if and only if x 
∈ [−w2, −w1)∪(w1, w2] and q = qH; otherwise, l(x, q|z, qH) = 0.
4. Election outcomes
  • If x ∈ [−w1, w1] and q = qH, then an incumbent is reelected.
  • If x ∈ [−w2, −w1)∪(w1, w2], q = qH and there is no 
positive signal from a challenger, then an incumbent is 
reelected.
  • Otherwise, a challenger is elected.
In words, the policy choices of incumbents across different types 
are as follows. Here I just discuss positive types. The policy choices 
across negative types can be found in a symmetric way.
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1. All low quality incumbents choose their own ideal policies and 
lose the election.
2. High quality incumbents whose ideal points are close to the 
median, z ∈ [0, w1], choose their ideal points and are reelected.
3. High quality incumbents whose ideal points are in (w1, c1] 
choose the policy w1 and are reelected.
4. High quality incumbents whose ideal points are in (c1, w2] 
choose their ideal points and are reelected only with 
probability 1− , that is, when a challenger is endowed with 
low quality.
5. High quality incumbents whose ideal points are in (w2, c2] 
choose the policy w2 and are reelected only with probability 
1− .
6. High quality incumbents whose ideal points are in (c2, 1] 
choose their ideal points and lose the election.
So, when high quality incumbents have policy preferences moderate 
enough, they implement policies which guarantee reelection. As the 
incumbents’ preferences get further from the median ideal point, they 
choose intermediate policies to have only a positive probability of 
winning the election. When the high quality incumbents’ policy 
preferences are extreme, however, they do not pursue winning the 
election and choose their own ideal points, and it is the same for all 
low quality incumbents. The policy choice strategies for high quality 
incumbents are visually expressed in Figure 1. In order to give the 
general intuition of the result, in this figure we present the case 
where w1  c1  w2  c2.
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Figure 1. High quality incumbents’ policy choices
And, the characteristics of the equilibrium related to the electoral 
competition can be summarized as follows.6)
1. “Moderate” policy choices by an incumbent with high quality 
guarantee a reelection without being contested by a positive 
signal from a challenger.
2. If an incumbent with high quality chooses “intermediate” 
policies, she is reelected only when there is no positive signal 
from a challenger. If a high quality challenger is selected in this 
case, the challenger sends a signal and gets elected.
3. If an incumbent with high quality chooses “extreme” policies, 
she is ousted from the office without being contested by a 
positive signal from challenger.
4. All incumbents with low quality are ousted from the office 
without being contested by a positive signal from a challenger.
6) We discuss voters’ belief about politicians’ types on and off-the-equilibrium 
path in the Appendix.
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5. Whenever a positive signal is sent on the equilibrium path, it is 
from a challenger with high quality and it conveys information 
only about challenger’s quality.
That is, when the incumbents are of high quality and take centrist 
policies, they always win the election. Therefore, no challenger has 
an incentive to send a signal. When the incumbents choose extreme 
policies, they always lose. Again therefore, no challenger needs to 
send a signal. However, when the incumbents’ policy choices are 
intermediate, high quality challengers send a signal but no low 
quality challengers do. In this case, the median voter prefers a high 
quality challenger to the incumbent, but prefers the incumbent to a 
low quality challenger. Therefore, the incumbent wins the election 
only when there is no signal. Finally, every low quality incumbent 
loses the election, so that there is no signal by any type of a 
challenger. The electoral consequences of incumbents’ policy choices 
and challengers’ signaling choices are summarized in Figure 2.
We now develop the intuition behind the main result. First, in the 
simple equilibrium there is an interval of policies, [−w1, w1], such 
that incumbents’ choosing policies in the inter- val always guarantees 
to win the next election. Why do some policy choices of incumbents 
with high quality guarantee reelection? Suppose an incumbent with 
high quality chooses the ideal policy of the median voter, zero. By 
stationarity of policy choices, voters expect that the incumbent would 
choose the same policy if reelected. Note that this outcome (zero 
policy and high quality) is the best for the median voter among all 
possible outcomes. Thus, unless the median voter is sure that a 
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challenger has high quality and will choose the zero policy, the 
median voter strictly prefers reelecting the incumbent to rejecting her. 
Suppose that a level of a signal can confirm that a challenger is of 
high quality and shares the preference with the median voter and that 
the median voter would vote for a challenger if the level of a signal 
is observed. Then, any challenger with extreme policy preferences 
would send the exactly same level of a signal, since the cost of 
doing so is constant across different policy preferences and ones with 
extreme preferences are more willing to change the current policy 
status quo. Thus, contradicting our supposition, no signal can inform 
voters that a challenger is of high quality and has the zero ideal 
point. Therefore, when observing zero policy choice from a high 
quality incumbent, the median voter strictly prefers the incumbent to 
any challenger. By continuity of utility functions, this argument must 
Figure 2. Electoral outcomes with high quality incumbent 
as a function of incumbent’s policy choice
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hold for policies very close to the median, that is, [−w1, w1].
What then determines the size of the interval, i.e., the magnitude 
of w1? As discussed in the previous paragraph, a signal from 
challengers cannot reveal different policy preferences in our 
equilibrium. Thus, as long as a policy from the incumbent, say x, 
gives as a high payoff to the median voter as the expected payoff 
from electing a high quality challenger with an unknown policy 
preference, implementing x guarantees permanent reelection. So, w1 is 
the policy from which the median receives the same payoff as the 
one expected from a high quality challenger.
We now discuss the case that incumbents choose a policy further 
from the median ideal point than w1. By symmetry of strategies, it is 
enough to discuss only positive policies. Suppose that an incumbent 
implements a policy x close to but greater than w1. In this case, 
every high quality challenger sends the same level of a positive 
signal, s, but no low quality challenger does so in our equilibrium. 
Thus, if voters observe a signal from a challenger, they believe the 
challenger is of high quality; and otherwise, they believe she is of 
low quality. Since x > w1 and the median voter is indifferent 
between electing an incumbent who chose w1 and electing a high 
quality challenger, the median voter strictly prefers electing a high 
quality challenger to electing an incumbent who chose x. However, if 
x is close enough to w1, the median voter prefers electing the 
incumbent to a low quality challenger. Thus, we can find an interval 
(w1, w2] such that, if the chosen policy lies in the interval, the 
election outcome depends on campaign activity from the challenger: 
if the challenger sends a signal at least as great as s, the challenger 
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wins the election; otherwise, the incumbent wins. Finally, if an 
incumbent chooses too extreme policies, i.e., ones greater than w2, 
then since policies are too bad for the median voter, the incumbent 
will not be reelected regardless of the challenger’s decision. The 
point w2 is the policy such that the median voter is indifferent 
between electing a high quality incumbent who chose w2 and electing 
a low quality challenger with an unknown policy preference.
The features of incumbents’ policy choices in the equilibrium are 
all intuitive. First, given the voting strategy of the median voter 
discussed before, any low quality incumbent has no chance to be 
reelected regardless of her policy choice. Thus, she will choose the 
best policy for herself to maximize the current policy payoff. Now 
consider a high quality incumbent. By symmetry, discussing only 
positive ideal point cases causes no loss of generality. Assume the 
incumbent’s ideal point is less than or equal to w1. Then by choosing 
her ideal point she can achieve both of her goals, i.e., to have the 
best policy and to remain in the office. Thus, the incumbent 
obviously will choose her ideal point.
By contrast, if the incumbent’s ideal point is in (w1, w2], she faces 
a trade-off. On the one hand, she can compromise to choose w1 and 
can remain in the office in the future. On the other hand, she can 
implement her own ideal point to have the best policy in the current 
period and risks a positive probability of facing a high quality 
challenger and being ousted from the office in the next period. 
Therefore, if the expected utility of compromising to w1 is greater 
than the expected utility of choosing her ideal point, then the 
incumbent will choose w1, and otherwise her choice will be her ideal 
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point. If the incumbent’s ideal point is close to w1, her loss of the 
policy payoff by compromising is small, so the expected utility of 
compromising to w1 would be greater than the expected utility of 
choosing her ideal point. By contrast, if it is far from w1, the 
inequality would be reversed. The point c1 is such that the incumbent 
with ideal point c1 is indifferent between implementing w1 and 
implementing c1. From the above logic, if the incumbent’s ideal point 
is less than c1, she will compromise to implement w1, and otherwise, 
she will choose her own ideal point.
High quality incumbents whose ideal points are in (w2, 1] face a 
similar trade-off. There are three different choices for them: to 
compromise to w1 and stay in office for sure, to compromise to w2 
and win the election with a positive probability 1 − , and to 
choose their ideal points and lose the election for sure. When c1 < 
w2, the first option is not as good as the second option. So, if an 
incumbent’s ideal point is close to w2, she will compromise to 
implement w2, otherwise, she will choose her ideal point. Similarly to 
c1, c2 is the policy such that the incumbent with ideal point c2 is 
indifferent between implementing c2 and implementing w2. The 
mathematical characterizations of all four cutpoints, w1, c1, w2, and 
c2, are provided in the Appendix.
In Theorem 1, we present sufficient conditions for an equilibrium 
with the discussed characteristics to exist: qH  ν and δ  
. The former is derived from the condition that in 
equilibrium every low quality incumbent loses the election against an 
unknown challenger. That is, the median voter must prefer electing 
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an unknown challenger to the best policy (the median policy) from a 
low quality incumbent. Since we normalize the low quality to qL = 
0, qH measures the quality difference between competent and 
incompetent politicians. Thus, the condition is met when the quality 
difference is great, the proportion of competent politician is high, or 
the variance of ideal points of politicians is small. The latter is 
derived from the condition that, when intermediate policies are 
chosen by high quality incumbents, every high quality challenger has 
the incentive to send a positive signal and no low quality challenger 
has the incentive. Notice that we do not impose a strong restriction 
of the cost of signaling. We allow the case that high quality 
challengers and low quality challengers share the same cost function. 
Finally, note that these conditions are only sufficient, but not 
necessary.
4. Observational Implications
In this section, we discuss implications of our equilibrium analysis, 
and then we present the dynamic properties and comparative statics 
of our simple equilibrium. Most notably, Theorem 1 predicts that 
strong campaign activity from challengers will be observed only when 
the performances of incumbents are at the medium level. Thanks to 
the median decisiveness given by Lemma 1, we may measure the 
performance of an incumbent by the utility of the median voter from 
the incumbent (with respect to both quality and a chosen policy) in 
the previous period. From this standard, incumbents with good 
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performance are those with high quality who chose a policy close to 
the median ideal point. In our equilibrium, every challenger gives up 
costly campaigning confronting such strong incumbents so that strong 
incumbents are reelected without seriously being challenged. By 
contrast, weak incumbents (those who chose a policy too far from 
the median or are incompetent in the valence dimension) will not be 
supported by the median voter, regardless of campaign from a 
challenger. Thus, in this case, no challenger has to launch a costly 
campaign since she can beat the incumbent without doing so. 
Therefore, we will observe strong campaign activity from challengers 
only in the case of incumbents with the medium strength, i.e., the 
case that effort is needed and can be effective.
The existing models of repeated elections provide no testable 
implication about the relationship between incumbents’ performances 
and the level of campaign activities from challengers because the 
models do not include a strategic challenger. By contrast, we provide 
one. Specifically, the strength of incumbents and the campaign 
activities of challengers will have a non-monotonic (thus nonlinear) 
relationship. If we regress the level of campaign activities from 
challenger, for example, measured by campaign spending of strong 
challengers, on the strengths of incumbents, we will observe that the 
level of challenger’s campaign activities increases initially in the low 
value range of the incumbent’s strength and then it decreases in the 
high value range of the incumbent’s strength. Thus, when empirically 
studying the relationship between these two variables, the usual linear 
statistical model will have a problem of misspecification.
In fact, we frequently observe that strong potential challengers give 
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up entering electoral competition, being afraid of being defeated by 
strong incumbents, which is consistent with our prediction. We may 
not often observe the cases that a challenger does not conduct 
electoral campaign actively when the incumbent is weak. The reason 
for this, however, may be that we observe a kind of censored data. 
Weak incumbents often decide not to run for reelection, so that such 
cases are not observed.
We now discuss the implications of our model on the incumbency 
advantage. First, in the equilibrium of our main result, an incumbent 
is reelected only when her performance is “not bad.” In other words, 
a low quality incumbent or a high quality incumbent with too 
extreme preference is not reelected in our equilibrium.
Second, some incumbents, however, may have some advantage 
because their political characteristics (valence and policy preferences) 
are better known to voters than those of challengers are. Consider an 
incumbent of high quality who chose a policy x ∈ [−w1, w1]. A 
selected challenger may be a better politician to the median voter 
than the incumbent, i.e., the challenger may be of high quality and 
have the ideal point closer to the median than x. However, there is 
no way that the challenger convince voters that she is a better 
candidate. This is true although we allow, in the model, that the 
challenger can send a costly signal. However, notice that this 
information asymmetry does not always favor incumbents. When 
incumbents are ‘bad,’ they will reveal it more easily than challengers.
One important question is whether our theory based on the 
assumption of rational voters can explain the huge incumbency 
advantage we observe in data. The next result is a positive answer to 
160   Insun Kang
this question.
Proposition 1 The simple equilibria have the following dynamic 
properties:
  • The ex ante probability that an incumbent gets reelected at t 
is increasing in t and converges to 1.
  • The probability that a low quality politician holds office at t 
is decreasing in t and converges to 0.
In our equilibrium, as time goes by, the probability that we 
observe an incumbent’s reelection increases and finally converges to 
one. This prediction is consistent with observed data that exhibits a 
growing incumbency advantage over time. The main reason of this 
result is that if a politician is the incumbent in a later period, it is 
highly probable that she is selected by voters before. That suggests 
that she is a good politician for the median and so she will be 
reelected in later elections. Thus, dynamic interactions between voters 
and politicians under representative democracy work as an overtime 
selection process of good politicians. This result is in the same line 
of Zaller’s (1998) electoral selection theory. He suggests that 
incumbents are better politicians than most of their opponents because 
candidates who have won in the past election must possess some 
characteristics that attract voters, and therefore, win in the future 
elections. That is, there are electoral selections through repeated 
elections.7)
7) There is increasing literature on the electoral selection. Ashworth (2005) 
models a repeated election game where voters reelect an incumbent 
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The boundary of the set of policies which guarantee incumbents’ 
permanent winning in simple equilibria, w1, depends on the values of 
parameters of the game. So does the size of the set of politicians 
who compromise, c1. The next result establishes the comparative 
statics of simple equilibria.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, w1 and c1 satisfy the following 
properties:
  • w1 is decreasing in δ.
  • w1 is decreasing in ρ.
  • c1 is increasing in δ.
  • c1 is increasing in ρ.
The results of the comparative statics are very intuitive. A higher 
δ means more patient voters. As the median voter becomes patient, 
she is willing to wait until she gets an office- holder who would 
implement a policy close enough to her ideal point. Then, even 
though the incumbent’s policy choice is not very far from the median 
ideal point, she can be ousted and replaced with a challenger. 
Moreover, if δ is high, then politicians are also patient. Thus, 
instead of pursuing the current best policy, they are more inclined to 
compromise to implement a policy that guarantees a reelection. So, 
considering her level of ability as well as her constituency service. The 
incumbency advantage arises since voters learn about the incumbent’s ability 
and only reelect ones with high level of ability. That is, the distribution of 
incumbent’s ability is better than the one of unknown challenger’s, a 
selection effect. Gowrisankaran et al. (2003) empirically show the selection 
effect which explains the strong incumbency advantage in the U.S. Senate 
elections.
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w1 decreases and c1 increases as δ increases.
A similar logic applies to the case about the office holding benefit 
ρ. If the office benefit increases, then more types of politicians 
pursue a reelection and so compromise. Then, since more politicians 
will compromise, the continuation value of challengers increases, 
implying that the median voter can use a higher standard for 
retaining an incumbent. Thus, w1 decreases and c1 increases as ρ 
increases.
In our game, the welfare of the median voter, measured by the ex 
ante equilibrium payoff, is a decreasing function of w1. Thus, as 
political actors become more patient and as the benefit of office 
increases, the median voter becomes better off. This can be a 
supportive argument of a more frequent election and a higher salary 
for representatives. Note that the existing models of repeated elections 
have results in a similar vain (e.g., Ferejohn 1986, Duggan 2000). 
Proposition 2 extends those results to the environment where there 
are strategic challengers.
Also, the result that as the office holding benefit, ρ, increases, c1 
increases makes interesting predictions of the effect of higher office 
holding benefit for representatives. Note that a bigger c1 implies a 
larger proportion of incumbents who are reelected for sure and a 
smaller probability of elections being actively competitive (with 
challenger’s signaling). Then, first, it predicts that higher benefit of 
office holding increases the incumbency advantage, and second, it 
predicts higher benefit of office holding decreases the level of 
electoral competitiveness. That is, for example, as the job of 
legislators becomes more valuable, the size of the incumbency 
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advantage gets larger and the election becomes less competitive. This 
prediction gets a good support from the literature on the state 
professionalization (Cox and Morgenstern 1993, 1995, Carey, Niemi, 
and Powell 2000, Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991). Generally, it is 
shown that state legislative professionalization, which is measured by 
session length, salary, and legislators’ operating resources, increases 
the incumbency advantage and decreases the electoral competitiveness. 
Cox and Morgenstern find that the amount of legislator’s operating 
budget explains the difference in the size of the incumbency 
advantage between states, and Carey et al. show legislators’ salaries 
play an important role in a bigger incumbency benefit in different 
states. About the decreasing electoral competitiveness in state 
legislative elections, Weber et al. show that the size of legislative 
expenditures is one of the most important factors to explain the 
tendency.
5. Discussion
In the simple equilibrium we found in this paper, once the 
incumbent implements a policy, voters know the incumbent’s future 
policy choice due to the stationarity as well as her quality level. 
However, most of the time voters do not know about the challenger’s 
type and even when they know the challenger’s quality by observing 
her signal, they do not know her policy preference. As a result, 
when a high quality incumbent has centrist policy preference, she can 
be reelected against any challenger without being contested by strong 
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challengers.
However, our equilibrium shows that under a wide range of 
parameter values challengers’ signaling conveys information about her 
quality level. When a high quality incumbent has an intermediate 
policy preference, a high quality challenger can be elected against the 
incumbent by sending a costly signal. In this case voters would elect 
the incumbent only when there is no signal. Thus, challengers’ good 
quality and campaigning help their electoral success, which is well 
supported by Squire’s (1992) empirical findings. Using 1988 U.S. 
Senate election data, he shows that when challengers have high 
quality and run campaigns well, they are better known and are more 
likely to get votes against incumbents. Our equilibrium shows that a 
strategic challenger’s signaling reduces the benefit of incumbency, and 
when the incumbent’s policy choice is not good enough, high quality 
challengers can win the election against the incumbent. This result is 
in the same line of the finding of Abramowitz (1975). According to 
him, the incumbency advantage comes from the reputation, which 
challengers cannot enjoy. However, the reputation is built based on 
the incumbent’s performance in office and when her performance is 
bad, the incumbent cannot be supported in elections.
Also, we find that moderate incumbents take a policy closer to the 
median when there is a signaling in equilibrium comparing to ones 
which they would take if there is no signaling. Voters have higher 
expected payoffs from electing a challenger due to the strategic 
campaigning by competent candidates and it in turn makes them have 
a higher standard for reelecting incumbents. In other words, the 
presence of strong challengers and the possibility of the loss in 
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reelection when they are challenged by a strong candidate enforce 
some incumbents take more moderate policies in order to stay in 
their seats. In this sense, this paper provides a good support for the 
argument that competitive elections keep public officials more 
accountable.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Let Θ be the set of parameters that satisfies the supposition of the theorem; that is,
Θ =
{
(δ, π, qH , ν, ρ) ∈ [0, 1)× (0, 1)× R+ × (0, 1)× R+
∣∣∣∣πqH ≤ ν and δ ≥
1 + ν + 2
√
qH + ν
(1− π)(1 + ρ+ ν)
}
.
Let θ = (δ, π, qH , ν, ρ) ∈ Θ. Let w2(θ) = √qH + ν, α(θ) = 1−δ1−δ(1−π) and β(θ) = (1− π)α(θ).
Define the function γ : R+ ×Θ → R so that, for each (z, θ) ∈ R+ ×Θ,
γ(z|θ) = −(1− δ)z2 + 2α(θ)w2(θ)z − α(θ)w2(θ)2 + δβ(θ)[w2(θ)2 + ρ].
Note that, for each given θ, γ(·|θ) is strictly decreasing on the right of w2(θ) and γ(w2(θ)|θ) ≥
0. Thus, there exists a unique z such that z ≥ w2(θ) and γ(z|θ) = 0. For each θ ∈ Θ, let
ĉ2(θ) be the unique point such that γ(ĉ2(θ)|θ) = 0 and ĉ2(θ) ≥ w2(θ). Define the function
ψ : R+ × [0, 1]×Θ → R so that, for each (z, x, θ) ∈ R+ × [0, 1]×Θ,
ψ(z, x|θ) = −α(θ)z2 + 2xz − α(θ)x2 + [1− α(θ)]ρ.
For each (x, θ) ∈ [0, 1]×Θ, ψ(·, x|θ) is strictly decreasing on the right of x and ψ(x, x|θ) ≥ 0.
Let ξ(x|θ) be the unique point such that ψ(ξ(x|θ), x|θ) = 0 and ξ(x|θ) ≥ x. Define the
function η : R+ × [0, 1]×Θ → R so that, for each (z, x, θ) ∈ R+ × [0, 1]×Θ,
η(z, x|θ) = 2[x− α(θ)w2(θ)]z + [1− α(θ)]ρ+ α(θ)[w2(θ)2 − x2].
For each θ ∈ Θ and each x ∈ [0, α(θ)w2(θ)), let ζ(x|θ) be the unique point such that
η(ζ(x|θ), x|θ) = 0. Define the function μ : R+ × [0, 1] × Θ → R so that, for each (z, x, θ) ∈
R+ × [0, 1]×Θ,
μ(z, x|θ) = −(1− δ)z2 + 2xz + δρ+ δβ(θ)w2(θ)2.
Note that μ(·, x|θ) has a unique critical point greater than x and μ(x, x, θ) > 0. For each
(x, θ) ∈ [0, 1]×Θ, let φ(x|θ) be the unique point such that μ(φ(x|θ), x|θ) = 0 and φ(x|θ) > x.
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ξ(x|θ) if ξ(x|θ) ≤ w2(θ),
ζ(x|θ) if ξ(x|θ) > w2(θ) and ζ(x|θ) ≤ ĉ2(θ),
φ(x|θ) otherwise.
Let c̃1(x|θ) = min{ĉ1(x|θ), 1}, w̃2(x|θ) = min{max{ĉ1(x|θ), w2(x|θ)}, 1}, and c̃2(x|θ) =
min{max{ĉ1(x|θ),
ĉ2(x|θ)}, 1}.


























Note that, for all x ∈ [0, 1], U(x|θ) ≤ qH . For each given θ ∈ Θ, define the function
K(·|θ) : [0, 1] → R so that, for each x ∈ [0, 1],
K(x|θ) = qH − U(x|θ)− x2.
Lemma 2 Let r(θ) =
�
qH − (1−π)(1−δ)π ν. Then, for all θ ∈ Θ, K(r(θ)|θ) ≤ 0.
Proof: The lemma can be proven by showing that, first, K(r(θ)|θ) ≤ 0 when δ = 0 and,
second, K(r(θ)|θ) is decreasing in δ. The detailed proof will be provided upon request.
It is obvious that K(0|θ) ≥ 0. By Lemma ??, K(r(θ)|θ) ≤ 0. Thus, there exists a point
x ∈ [0, r(θ)] such that K(x|θ) = 0. Fix θ. Let w1 be the point such that K(w1|θ) = 0. Let
w2 = w̃2(w1|θ), c1 = c̃1(w1|θ), and c2 = c̃2(w1|θ). Since δ ≤ 1+ν+2
√
qH+ν
(1−π)(1+ρ+ν) , there exists s ∈ R+
such that 1 + ρ+ ν + 2
√
qH+ν
1−δ(1−π) ≤ c(s|qL) and c(s|qH) ≤ ρ1−δ(1−π) .
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Define a profile of strategies and beliefs σ = (v, l, p, ηI , ηC , π̃) as follows. For simplicity,
we only specify the median voters’ voting strategy.
• v(x, q, s|0) = 1 if and only if
q = qH ∧
[
x ∈ [−w1, w1] ∨ (x ∈ [−w2,−w1) ∪ (w1, w2] ∧ s < s)
]
.
• l and p are as defined in the theorem.
• Beliefs ηI , ηC , and π̃ are derived from v, l, p via Bayes rule on the equilibrium path.
Off the equilibrium path:
1. Once a politician chooses a policy that is not supposed to be adopted, voters
believe that he/she will choose the same policy in the future.
2. No policy deviation from an incumbent affects voters’ belief about challengers.
3. If a challenger sends a signal when no signal is supposed to be observed, then
voters always believe that the challenger is of high quality.
It is clear that σ satisfies the properties stated in the theorem. We now need to show that
σ is an equilibrium. Let UHz denote the expected utility for voters with ideal point z from
electing a high quality challenger with unknown policy preference. Similarly, ULz denotes
the expected utility from electing a low quality challenger and Ūz denotes the expected
utility from electing a challenger with unknown quality. Notice that UHz can be understood
as the expected utility from a lottery. Since every voter has quadratic preference over
policies and policy choices of politicians are symmetric around zero, it must be the case that
UHz = u(0; z) + U
H
0 . Note that, from the specification of σ,
UHz = U(w1|θ) = −w21 + qH ,
where the second equality uses the fact that K(w1|θ) = 0. Also,
ULz = (1− δ)
∫ 1
−1
[u(y; z) + qL]f(y)dy + δŪz
= (1− δ)[u(0; z)− ν] + δŪz, (1)




z + (1− π)ULz . (2)
Using (??) and (??), we obtain
ULz = α(θ)[u(0; z)− ν] + [1− α(θ)]UHz ,
and
Ūz = u(0; z)− β(θ)ν + [1− β(θ)]UHz .
Consider optimality of the voting strategy for the median voter. Let x ∈ [−w1, w1] and
s ∈ R+. Then
U0(1|x, qH , s; σ) = −x2 + qH ≥ −w21 + qH = UH0 = U0(0|x, qH , s; σ).
Thus, v(x, qH , s|0) = 1 is optimal. Let x ∈ [−w2,−w1) ∪ (w1, w2]. Suppose s ≥ s. Then
U0(1|x, qH , s; σ) = α(θ)[−x2 + qH ] + [1− α(θ)]UH0 ≤ UH0 = U0(0|x, qH , s; σ).
So v(x, qH , s|0) = 0 is optimal. Now suppose s < s. Then
U0(1|x, qH , s; σ) ≥ α(θ)[−w2 + qH ] + [1− α(θ)]UH0 = UL0 = U0(0|x, qH , s; σ).
Thus, v(x, qH , s|0) = 1 is optimal. Let x ∈ [−1,−w2) ∪ (w2, 1]. Then
U0(1|x, qH , s; σ) ≤ UL0 ≤ Ū0 ≤ UH0 .
So, v(x, qH , s|0) = 0 is optimal for all s. Finally, consider the case where the incumbent
is of low quality. For every x, U0(1|x, qL, s; σ) ≤ U0(1|0, qL, s; σ) = δŪ0. Note that, since
w1 ≤ r(θ),
Ū0 = −β(θ)ν + [1− β(θ)](−w21 + qH) ≥ 0.
Thus,





z + (1− π)ULz . (2)
Using (??) and (??), we obtain
ULz = α(θ)[u(0; z)− ν] + [1− α(θ)]UHz ,
and
Ūz = u(0; z)− β(θ)ν + [1− β(θ)]UHz .
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So v(x, qH , s|0) = 0 is optimal. Now sup ose s < s. Then
U0(1|x, qH , s; σ) ≥ α(θ)[−w2 + qH ] + [1− α(θ)]UH0 = UL0 = U0(0|x, qH , s; σ).
Thus, v(x, qH , s|0) = 1 is optimal. Let x ∈ [−1,−w2) ∪ (w2, 1]. Then
U0(1|x, qH , s; σ) ≤ UL0 ≤ Ū0 ≤ UH0 .
So, v(x, qH , s|0) = 0 is optimal for all s. Finally, consider the case where the incumbent
is of low quality. For every x, U0(1|x, qL, s; σ) ≤ U0(1|0, qL, s; σ) = δŪ0. Note that, since
w1 ≤ r(θ),
Ū0 = −β(θ)ν + [1− β(θ)](−w21 + qH) ≥ 0.
Thus,
U0(0|0, qL, s; σ) = Ū0 ≥ δŪ0 ≥ U0(1|x, qL, s; σ).
1 2
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Therefore, it is optimal not to elect any incumbent with low quality.
Now consider signaling strategies. It is obvious that challengers send zero signal when
signaling does not affect the election outcome. So, it is enough to consider that case that
x ∈ [−w2,−w1) ∪ (w1, w2]. Take any ideal point z.




1− δ(1− π) − c(s|qH)
]
≥ 0.
V(z,qL)(s; x, qH)− V(z,qL)(0; x, qH) ≤ V(−1,qL)(s;w2, qH)− V(−1,qL)(0;w2, qH)
= A(θ)
[




1− δ(1− π) − c(s|qL)
]
≥ 0,
where A(θ) is a positive constant. Therefore, all signaling strategies in σ are optimal.
Finally, consider policy choices of incumbents. For low quality incumbents. p(z, qL) = z
is obviously optimal since policy choices do not affect the election outcome. Now note that,
for every z ∈ (w1, w2), ψ(z, w1|θ) = W(z,qH)(w1; σ)−W(z,qH)(z; σ). Also, for every z ∈ [w2, 1],
η(z, w1|θ) = W(z,qH)(w1; σ) −W(z,qH)(w2; σ), μ(z, w1|θ) = W(z,qH)(w1; σ) −W(z,qH)(z; σ), and
γ(z|θ) = W(z,qH)(w2; σ) − W(z,qH)(z; σ). Thus, by construction and symmetry, all policy
choices of high quality incumbents are optimal. Therefore, σ is an equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 1
For t = 1, 2, . . . , let P t denote the ex ante probability that the election winner at t is the
incumbent at t − 1 in the equilibrium σ in Theorem 1. Let Lt denote the probability that
the election winner at t is of low quality. We will show that P t is increasing and converges
to one and that Lt is decreasing and converges to zero.
Let T1 = [−c1, c1]×{qH}, T2 = ([−c2, c1)∪ (c1, c2])×{qH}, and T3 = (X ×Q) \ (T1 ∪T2).
For t = 0, 1, . . . , let P t1 be the probability that the type of office holder at t belongs to T1,
P t2 be the probability that it belongs to T2, and P
t
3 be the probability that it belongs to T3.
Let N1 =
∫ c1
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From the specification of strategies in σ,
P t2 = P
t−1
2 (1− π) + [P t−12 + P t−13 ]πN2, (3)
and
P t3 = P
t−1
3 (1− π) + [P t−12 + P t−13 ]πN3 (4)
for every t = 1, 2, . . . . By adding (??) and (??), we obtain P t2+P
t
3 = [1−πN1](P t−12 +P t−13 ).
Since P 02 + P
0
3 = 1− πN1,
P t2 + P
t
3 = [1− πN1]t+1, (5)
implying P t1 = 1− [1− πN1]t+1. From the strategies, P t = P t−12 + P t−12 (1− π). Then, since
P t1 → 1, P t → 1. Also, Lt = P t−13 (1− π). Since P t2 + P t3 → 0, Lt → 0.













(1− πN1)t+1 − (1− π)t+1
]
.
Then, for every t = 1, 2, . . . ,





+ (1− π)t−1πN2(1− π)
N2 +N3
> 0.
Thus, P t is increasing. Also, for every t = 1, 2, . . . ,





− (1− πN1)tπN1 N3
N2 +N3
< 0,
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Proof of Proposition 2
We will prove the proposition for the case that c1 < w2 < c2 < 1. The proofs for the other
cases are similar and simpler.
Simple exercises of calculus show that ∂γ
∂δ
(z|θ) ≥ 0, ∂γ
∂ρ
(z|θ) ≥ 0, and ∂γ
∂z
(z|θ) ≤ 0. Also,
∂
∂δ
|x=w1ψ(z, x, θ) ≥ 0, ∂∂ρ |x=w1ψ(z, x, θ) ≥ 0, ∂∂z |x=w1ψ(z, x, θ) ≤ 0, and ∂∂x |x=w1ψ(z, x, θ) ≥ 0.
Then, by implicit function theory, ∂ĉ2
∂δ
(θ) ≥ 0, ∂ĉ2
∂ρ
(θ) ≥ 0, ∂
∂δ
|x=w1 ĉ1(x|θ) ≥ 0, ∂∂ρ |x=w1 ĉ1(x|θ) ≥
0, and ∂
∂x
|x=w1 ĉ1(x|θ) ≥ 0. Then ∂∂δ |x=w1U(x|θ) ≥ 0 and ∂∂ρ |x=w1U(x|θ) ≥ 0, which implies
∂
∂δ
|x=w1K(x|θ) ≤ 0 and ∂∂ρ |x=w1K(x|θ) ≤ 0.


































Then, U(x|θ) = −E(x)
D(x)

























ĉ1(x|θ)[1− α(θ)] < 0.
Since E(w1)
D(w1)




























Since w21 − α(θ)ĉ1(w1|θ)2 < 0, E
′(w1)
D(w1)




















proving the first part and the second part of the proposition. The remaining parts can be
proven similarly.
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Abstract




The existing formal studies on the incumbency advantage do not take strategic 
choices of electoral challengers into account. We develop a dynamic model of 
infinitely repeated electoral competition that incorporates strategic challengers and 
shows the endogenous emergence of the incumbency advantage. Politicians’ 
characteristics are of two dimensions, policy and quality. We assume that policy 
preferences are heterogeneous among players but everyone prefers to elect a high 
quality candidate. Candidates’ types which are defined by policy preference and 
quality are private information but by observing the incumbent’s policy choice 
voters know the incumbent’s type while nothing is revealed about a challenger. 
With a strategic challenger we find an equilibrium in which only high quality 
challengers campaign to distinguish themselves from low quality challengers and 
win the election. However, we still find a strong incumbency advantage accruing 
from voters’ ignorance about the challenger’s policy preference relative to their 
knowledge of the incumbent.
Key Words
Incumbency advantage, strategic challengers, US elections, electoral 
campaign, formal modeling of repeated elections
